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Preface
At the request of several of our members, the Council of Michigan Foundations (CMF) retainedCambridge Associates, Inc. in the late fall of 1998 to evaluate the private foundation payout raterequired by the federal government, based on the real returns of a group of Michigan private
foundations over a 25-year period of time. CMF had previously commissioned a payout study by the
University of Michigan School of Business in 1981.
Sustainable Payout for Foundations represents the culmination of a year of careful research and analysis.
We want to especially thank Bruce Myers and his colleagues from Cambridge Associates, Inc., and the
members of the Technical Advisory Subcommittee, chaired by Robert E. Swaney, Jr., Vice President &
Chief Investment Officer of the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, for their time and many contributions to
this effort:
Lesle Berent, Senior Accountant, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
Dr. Charles T. Clotfelter, Professor of Economics, Duke University
Nick Gabriel, Treasurer & Director, Ford Foundation
Edward M. Hunia, Treasurer, The Kresge Foundation
Dr. Saul H. Hymans, Professor of Economics & Statistics, University of Michigan
Dorothy A. Johnson, President Emeritus, Council of Michigan Foundations
Paul J. Lawler, Vice President for Finance/Treasurer, W. K. Kellogg Foundation
David R. Lindberg, Vice Pres. Finance & Adm., Council of Michigan Foundations
Richard K. Rappleye, Vice Pres. & Secretary /Treasurer, C. S. Mott Foundation
Michael J. Smith, Assistant Vice President, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
This important research study would not be possible without initial grant support from the Charles Stewart
Mott Foundation, The Kresge Foundation, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, the Herbert H. & Grace A.
Dow Foundation, and the Mawby Fund of CMF.  For additional copies of this final report, we encourage
interested parties to download it from the CMF Web site at www.cmif.org because limited copies have
been produced.
Because we believe this is the first time real rates of return have been studied over an extended period of
time, we are confident that this study is an important addition to the research needed on the issue of the
sustainable level of payout for private foundations.
Robert S. Collier
President
Council of Michigan Foundations
Margaret A. Riecker
Chair
Council of Michigan Foundations
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Study Summary
Context
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the sustainable
real (inflation-adjusted) level of  payout for private foun-
dations in light of the actual experience of a sample of
private foundations with diversified portfolios located
in the State of Michigan.  Previous discussions of pri-
vate foundation payout have focused on simulated re-
turns using index data.  While that analysis is performed
here as well, this study examines (perhaps for the first
time) the actual returns of a sample of private founda-
tions.
Scope of Study
• At the request of the Council of Michigan Founda-
tions, information was collected from a pool of
Michigan foundations having operating histories of
25 years or more.
• Using data reported to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice on IRS Form 990PF, contributions, disburse-
ments, and asset values for the period 1973-97
were assembled. This information provided the
basis to calculate an implied rate of return for the
subject foundations, as well as to quantify the
amounts disbursed by the foundations each year.
• Additionally, a large number of the subject founda-
tions provided asset allocation data for a series of
key years from 1973-97.  From this information,
the aggregate weighted asset allocation of the sub-
ject pool was quantified.
• The actual performance of Michigan foundations
was compared to returns that would have been
generated by a passive allocation to the S&P
500 and the Lehman Government/Corporate
Bond indexes.
Issues of Sustainability
• Although some charitable foundations are self-
liquidating, most donors establish foundations
with the idea of pursuing their missions in
perpetuity.
• For these founda-
tions, the most impor-
tant investment policy
question is: What
level of giving can be
maintained without
depleting the real (i.e.,
inflation-adjusted)
value of the fund over
the long term?
• The answer is: spend-
ing must be less than
the real rate of return
on investment; other-
wise, the fund’s real
value and real payout
will decline.
• In order to maintain
a sustainable real
level of payout over
time, foundations must predict a rate of return on
their investments as well as the likely variability of
returns. This study explores the long-term,
“equilibrium” 1  returns, and variability of returns
for the relevant asset classes with the assumption
that all investors could earn these returns by
indexing their portfolios.  In practice, foundations
with actively managed portfolios or high concen-
trations in single stock holdings may earn higher
or lower returns, but for illustrative purposes this
study assumed generic, indexed portfolios.
1 In other words, these are estimates of very long-term (30+ years) average annual returns, without regard to current market valuations and
absent any view as to whether shorter-term prospective returns are likely to be higher or lower than these long-term averages.
I n this study,the question
has been:  what
is the sustain-
able level of real
payout for
private founda-
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Analyses
Three approaches were
taken to answer the ques-
tion of how much a fund
can spend without deplet-
ing its real value over time.
•  Historical analysis of
portfolios invested
65% in U.S. equities






spending was set at
various annual rates.
•   The actual returns earned and monies paid out by
a group of 33 Michigan foundations with diversi-
fied investment portfolios (i.e., excluding those
heavily invested in a single company) in the
period 1973-972  were analyzed.
•   An analysis was performed of the statistical
probability that funds invested 65% in U.S.
equities and 35% in U.S. bonds would have
maintained their real purchasing power at the end
of a 25- or 30-year period in the future using a
variety of payout levels.
Conclusions
• Simulations using historical index data show that a
5% spending rate is perhaps slightly too high to
maintain purchasing power in perpetuity. Payout
rates in excess of 5% almost guarantee the deple-
tion of the real value of a foundation over the long
term, resulting in it being unable to maintain its
spending, in constant dollar terms, without liqui-
dating.
• Data from the actual experience from 1973-97 of
a group of Michigan foundations with diversified
portfolios do not support a payout rate higher than
5%.
• The model of estimated future returns indicates
that over a 25-year period a fund with a 5%
payout rate has a 56% probability of maintaining
its real value, whereas this probability drops to
44% for a fund with a 6% payout.  Over a 30-
year period, a









43% with a 6%
payout.
A ctual data from1973-97 returns

















was set at  various
annual rates.
2 At the time the study was launched, data from private foundation tax returns were available only through 1997.
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    Sustainable Payout for Foundations
1
 Internal Revenue Code, §4942.
2
 Throughout this study, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been used to convert nominal results into real, or inflation-adjusted, results.
3
 See Appendix D for the methodology of imputing investment rates of return from the Form 990PF data.
I.  Introduction
T he Council of Michigan Foundations has retained Cambridge Associates to analyze and
comment on the appropriateness of the current 5%
minimum distribution rule for private foundations set
forth in the Internal Revenue Code.1   Specifically,
we have been asked to analyze the way in which
this payout provision
impacts an objective
of sustaining the real
(inflation-adjusted)2





ated long-term rates of
return) have focused
on simulated results
using past returns on
various market
indexes.  While that
analysis is performed
here as well, this study
utilizes and analyzes
the actual experience





To that end, information was collected on a pool of
Michigan foundations with operating histories of 25
years or more (the response pool).  Contributions,
disbursements, and asset values reported to the
IRS on Form 990PF were assembled for 48
Michigan foundations covering the 25-year period from
1973-97.  The year 1973 was chosen as the start point
since the market value of non-charitable assets was first
required to be reported to the IRS beginning in 1972
(which in turn became the base year for the purposes of
return calculations). Data drawn from the Form 990PF
were then used to compute an implied rate of return and
calculate the percentage of non-charitable assets that met,
each year, the IRS definition of a qualified disbursement.3
Sections II through IV of this study are backward
looking and reflect a period of extraordinary market
events.  After the steep stock market declines of 1973-
74 and the high inflation of 1980-81, the equity and fixed
income markets in the late 1980s and 1990s have
earned real rates of return significantly above the 20th
century average.
Section II quantifies the effects of a change in the payout
rate by showing what would have resulted from modestly
higher and lower rates over the past 30 years. Hypo-
thetical portfolios based on passively held indexes are
used as the reference point, and payout rates ranging
from 4% to 7% are modeled. Sections III and IV report
on the actual experience of the Michigan response pool,
summarizing asset allocation information in Section III,
and weighted average pool returns in Section IV.
Section V reports on the IRS payout requirements,
while Section VI looks to the future.  Using Monte
Carlo simulations we estimate the distribution of long-
term rates of return and calculate the probabilities of
maintaining purchasing power under different payout
rates.  Section VII provides the study’s conclusions,
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I n this section we first posit a simple portfolio invested 65% in the S&P 500 Index and 35% in
the Lehman Brothers Government/Corporate Index.4
We then show the effects of changes in the spending
rate over the past 30 years on this simple, passively-
invested portfolio.  The purpose here is to isolate
changes in spending rate by simplifying asset alloca-
tion and eliminating manager selection bias. This
65/35 allocation approximates the average asset
allocation for diversified Michigan foundations during
the study’s 1973-97 time frame.
As a simplifying assumption, spending was assumed
to occur at a constant percentage of a four-quarter
moving market value.5   In this model, cash disburse-
ments (at the rate of one quarter of the constant
percentage of a four-quarter moving average) are
also recognized and accounted for.
Results of 4%,
5%, 6%, and 7%
Payout Rates
Over Time
Exhibit 1 (page 12)
models the level of real
spending and real
market values after
spending for the 65/35
hypothetical portfolio
described above for the
30-year period 1969-
98.  This 30-year period
was selected because it
includes both unfavor-
able and favorable
market conditions.  In each case, a beginning market
value of $100 million was assumed.
•  Real fund market value increased under a 4%
spending rule, with the corpus of the hypothetical
endowment growing from $100 million in 1969
to $160.43 million by the end of 1998. Real
spending was also enhanced, and grew from
$4 million in 1969 to $5.07 million in 1998.
•  Under a 5% spending rule, the purchasing power
of the foundation grew from $100 million in 1969
to $119.52 million at the end of 1998.  The
purchasing power of the distributions declined to
$4.78 million at the end of the period (from
$5 million at the beginning of the period).
•  A 6% spending rule would have eroded the
purchasing power of the foundation’s endow-
ment, with the real ending market value dropping
to $88.58 million at the end of the period.
Spending, which is tied to market value through
the constant percentage rule mandated by federal
law, also dropped from an initial level of
$6 million at the beginning of the period to
$4.30 million by its end.  This represents a
decline of more than 25% in terms of the real
purchasing power of the foundation’s payout.
•  Under a 7% spending rule, the declines in real
fund market value and levels of spending are
more dramatic, with the level of real spending
dropping nearly in half over the 30-year period,
and fund market value declining over a third in
real terms.
II.  Past Returns Using Passive Allocations:  Effects of Changes in the Payout Rate











 For studies performing similar analysis over different time periods see: Trotter and Harrison, Spending Policies and Investment Planning for
Foundations (1999) and Reilly and Skadden, Private Foundations: The Payout Requirement and its Effect on Investment and Spending Policies
(1981).
5
 The actual federal rule in place since 1982 requires spending to meet or exceed 5% of the 12-month average market value of non-charitable
assets after certain adjustments.  The federal rule ignores the timing of distributions during the course of the fiscal year, mandating only that
a specified minimum amount be distributed.  A fixed percent of a four-quarter average market value (with quarterly distributions to grantees)
conforms more closely to actual foundation grantmaking while simplifying the modeling process.
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•  Real payout and real market value of the portfo-
lios declined steeply in the early years of this
period irrespective of the payout rate being
modeled.  At the 4% and 5% levels, real ending
market values only regained their initial value by
virtue of the extraordinarily strong financial
markets of the 1990s. Only the 4% payout rate
ever fully regained the inflation-adjusted level of
the initial amount of payout in 1968.
Why the reliance on real values (for both payout and
fund market value) instead of a calculation reporting
nominal values?  Some donors may anticipate, or
even encourage, the foundations they endow to
spend themselves out of existence over time by
disproportionately benefiting current programming at
the expense of future programming.  Such donor
intent, when it exists, is compatible with the current
federal rule which mandates a minimum level of
payout and permits a foundation to set itself on a
course where its future role will be less than its
present role. Many donors, however, establish
foundations to provide for both current and future
needs and maintain comparable levels of program-
ming. That objective can only be achieved by main-
taining the real value of the payout.
Exhibit 1 illustrates the way in which the level of
prescribed payout acts as a balancing device be-
tween current and future spending.  A spending rate
that preserves purchasing power of both the fund
market value and payout stream holds constant the
scope of programming that a foundation can fund
over time.  Put another way, a payout rate that is too
low allows a foundation to accumulate assets and
provide greater resources in the future at the expense
of current programming, while a payout rate that is
too high has the opposite result.
Exhibit 1 graphically illustrates that  the lowest initial
level of payout rises to the highest future real payout,
while the highest initial level of payout results in the
lowest future real payout. A payout rate that is overly
high will initially produce high levels of payout, but
will, over time erode the value of both the fund and
the absolute level of dollars being paid out from that
fund.  A lower payout rate will enable the fund to
accumulate value and will result in higher absolute
levels of real










Effect of High Levels of Payout
During a Bear Market
Exhibit 2 (page 13) illustrates the effects of raising the
level of payout at the end of a bull market, only to
enter a bear market with a high level of payout.  Two
portfolios were modeled, both of which were in-
vested 65% in U.S. equities and 35% in U.S. bonds.
The only difference in the two portfolios was the
payout rule being used.
The portfolio labeled “Fund A” used a constant 5%
payout (computed on a four-quarter basis), while the
second portfolio (labeled “Fund B”) employed a
variable payout rate.
Specifically, Fund B
raised payout during the
last days of the bull
market of the late 1960s
and early 1970s, in-
creasing payout from
5% in 1969 to a peak of
7% in 1973.  As a result
of the bear market, the
hypothetical foundation
reduced payout in a
stair-step fashion
beginning in 1976,
returning to the 5% level
by 1978.
A comparison of the
results for these two
portfolios yields some
additional insights. The
O nly the 5%payout rule
comes closest to
preserving purchas-
ing power and level




Purpose of      Hypothetical
Portfolios:
To compare the
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constant payout rate suffers less during the bear
market of 1973-74, although it still shows a dramatic
drop in value.  While the Fund B portfolio declines
nearly 60% (from an initial market value of $100
million to a 1978 value of $40.65 million), the Fund
A portfolio declines 54% to a level of $46.22 million.
Once both portfolios are again paying out at a 5%
rate, the constant payout portfolio is actually disburs-
ing a higher absolute level of payout because of
having suffered less erosion of capital during the
worst of the bear market.
While the effects of the bear market illustrate part of
the cost of having too high a payout rate during a
bear market period, Exhibit 2 also shows another
result.  As the market recovered in the period follow-
ing 1978 (and proceeded on to a full-fledged bull
market beginning in 1982), the constant 5% payout
portfolio was able to grow off of a larger base and
more rapidly increase asset size and level of payout.





terms) to its 1968
level of payout.
The level of payout
from the variable,
or Fund B, portfo-
lio was still some-
what less in real
terms than it had
been at the begin-
ning of the period.
This analysis illustrates the potential long-term dam-
age that can result from raising payout rates during
periods of economic boom and above-average
returns on capital assets.
III.  Asset Allocation of the Response Pool Over Time
W orking from Form 990PF data, asset alloca- tion for the foundations in the response pool
was gathered for four particular years chosen to
illustrate significant points in time in the capital mar-
kets over the last 30 years. The years chosen were
1974, 1981, 1994, and 1997 and the reported asset
allocations are as of the end of the foundation’s fiscal
year for those years.  The 1974 data capture the bulk
of the effects resulting from the severe equity bear
market in 1973-74.  The 1981 data reflect the effects
of the bear market in bonds of 1979-81, and mea-
sure asset allocation prior to the beginning of the bull
market in 1982.  The 1994 data illustrate the cumula-
tive effects of the bull market and 1997 is the final
year of the study of the response pool. Weighted
average asset allocations for the response pool are
set out in Exhibit 3 (page 14).6
Throughout this 25-year period, the response pool of
Michigan foundations increased, on average, its
allocation to equities.  From a low of 53.9% in 1974,
the allocation increased to 56.8% in 1981 and to a
high of 64.9% in 1997. Surveys of higher education
endowments also indicate allocations to equities
approaching 65% by 1997.7   Also noteworthy is the
consistent allocation to fixed income (ranging from
21.7% in 1974 to 27.4% in 1997). Allocations to
cash were higher than expected, with significant
levels of cash in the bear market periods of 1974
(18.7%) and 1981 (19.3%). From this, one might
reasonably draw the conclusion that, within the
response pool, it was cash rather than high-quality
bonds that was viewed as a safe haven in volatile
markets.
T he variable rateportfolio illus-
trates the potential
long-term damage







6 The data in Exhibit 3 reflect 26 foundations holding diversified portfolios who provided asset allocation data to us (out of a total universe
of 33 diversified foundation portfolios).  Appendix C shows the same data with foundations holding single stock concentrations added in.
The resulting allocations to equity are much higher.
7 By way of comparison, NACUBO data for the years 1974, 1981, 1994, and 1997 indicate average equity allocations of 65.6%, 47.6%,
54.7%, and 63.8% (respectively) for that pool of tax-exempt portfolios.  NACUBO is the National Council of College and University
Business Officers.  NACUBO has sponsored a comprehensive survey of college and university endowment returns and asset allocations
each year since 1974.
6
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IV.  Return Experience of Response Pool
I n this study, rate of return data have been collected to illustrate the actual experience of
foundations in Michigan over the last 25 years.
The returns earned by the foundations in the response
pool with diversified portfolios are set out below,8
and compared to returns from a passively-invested
portfolio invested 65% in the S&P 500 and 35% in
U.S. fixed income securities.
1973-97 Returns
                 65%/35% Indexed         33 Diversified
    Portfolio     Michigan Portfolios
Nominal         11.80% 11.04%
 Real  6.00% 5.27%
The year 1973 was chosen as the start point since
the market value of non-charitable assets was first
required to be reported to the IRS in 1972 (which in
turn became the base year for the purposes of return
calculations). The last year for which IRS data was
available was 1997.  Returns were approximated
using the data available on the IRS Form 990PF and
calculated according to the methodology set forth in
Appendix D.
As noted in Section III, the average allocation to
equities varied between 54% and 65% over the
range of this period. A portfolio passively allocated
65% in U.S. equities and 35% in U.S. bonds and
rebalanced annually would have returned 11.8%
nominal and 6.0% real returns during 1973-97 (gross
of fees). For the period of this study, therefore, the
actual experience of diversified Michigan foundations
was not significantly different from the returns
achieved with similar passive allocations, albeit lower.
The lower levels of returns can be partially explained
by the effect of investment management fees and
commissions (which are not reflected in the index
returns).
The returns from the response pool do not differ
substantially from similar passive allocations, which
provide support for the use of index data for model-
ing potential results over longer time frames, as was
done in Section II of this study.
V.  IRS Payout Requirements
T he Internal Revenue Code effectively requires the distribution of at least 5% of the value of a
private foundation’s average annual investment
assets. The origin of a mandatory minimum payout for
private foundations had its genesis in the Tax Reform
Act of 1969.  Initially, private foundations were
required to pay out the greater of adjusted net income
(as defined in the Act) or a fixed percentage which
varied over time.9  The level of required distribution
was subsequently adjusted in 1981, and the present
rule of a 5% required payout was instituted.
The investment portfolio of a foundation is referred to
in the IRS Code as “non-charitable assets,” which is
to say, assets not used in the management and
administration of the foundation’s activities.10   The
8 Of the 48 responding foundations, 15 had single-stock concentrations that skewed the performance data.  Returns set out above represent
the 33 foundations with diversified portfolios. Returns for the full universe of 48 foundations and various subsets are set out in Appendix D.
9
 Adjusted net income was defined primarily as interest, dividends, rents, royalties, short-term capital gains, gross profit from business activities,
and certain income modifications less expenses incurred in the production of investment income. For organizations organized after May 26,
1969, the payout requirement was 6% up through tax year 1971, 5.5% in 1972, 5.25% in 1973, 6% in 1974 and 1975, and 5% in 1976.  For
organizations organized prior to May 26, 1969, the payout requirement was 4 .125% for 1972, 4.375% for 1973, 5.5% for 1974, 6% in 1975,
and 5% in 1976.  The adjusted net income requirement was eliminated in 1982, leaving just the 5% minimum investment return requirement.
10
 The following items would be excluded from the value of non-charitable use assets: office equipment and the portion of a building and physical
facilities (i.e., artwork on display and classroom equipment) used by the foundation for its charitable purpose.  Any interest in a functionally
related business and cash equal to 1.5% of the fair market value of non-charitable use assets would also be excluded as well as property leased
by the foundation for a program-related purpose.  Reg. Sec. 53.4942(a)-2(c)(3)(iii).
7
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value reported to the IRS as non-charitable assets for
any given year is the average value of the investment
portfolio for the tax year.  If at the beginning of a new
tax year at least 5% of the value of average annual
non-charitable assets for the previous year has not
been distributed,11  the Code provides for a one-year
grace period. If the required distribution is not made
by the end of the grace period, then the Code imposes
a penalty of 15% of the undistributed amount.   If such
undistributed amounts remain in the foundation’s hands
at the end of the subsequent tax year, the Code
imposes a 100% tax on those remaining amounts.
These payout requirements are, however, subject to a
carry-forward credit for over-disbursements in previ-
ous years.  Thus, a private foundation disbursing more
than 5% in a previous year may elect to disburse less
than 5% in subsequent years as long as the amount of
under-disbursement in the subsequent year does not
exceed the amount of prior over-disbursement.  The
penalties are sufficiently severe that private foundations
are unlikely to disburse less than the minimum payout,
although these foundations may always disburse more.
Actual Levels of Payout
In order to understand the actual payout practices of
Michigan foundations, we collected Form 990PF
data on qualifying distributions from 1973-97. By
dividing the reported figures for qualifying distribu-
tions by the reported value of non-charitable assets, a
payout percentage can be obtained. For the full 25-
year period, the average12  payout rate for the pool
was 5.5%, but this period should be broken down
into two sub-periods.
The actual payout rate from 1973-81 averaged
6.68%.  As noted in Footnote 9, on page 7, payout
requirements for those years mandated distribution of
the higher of adjusted net income, including interest
and dividends, or a set percentage (the “minimum
investment return”) ranging from 4.375% to 6%.
Due to the higher yields available on marketable
securities at that time, adjusted net income for many
foundations exceeded 6%. As a result, by the early
1980s, foundation assets had eroded due to the
combination of high inflation, low market returns, and
the effect of the actual payout from the portfolios
each year.13  Congress responded to this deteriora-
tion in real asset value (and the prospect of deterio-
rating sustainable real payout) by reducing the
percentage used in calculating the minimum invest-
ment return to 5% of asset values in 1976, and in
1982 by repealing the requirement of distributing
adjusted net income if higher than the minimum
investment return.
For the subsequent period of 1982-97, when the 5%
requirement was in force, the payout rate for the
surveyed Michigan foundations was 4.86%.  Payout
was less than 5% during the years 1983 through
1993 for the following reasons:
• Carry-forward credits for over disbursements in
previous years allowed payout to decline below
the mandatory 5% level.
• Increasing equity and bond valuations, coupled
with the one-year grace period for meeting the
payout requirements, resulted in annual disburse-
ments of less than 5%.
From 1993-97, payout levels trended toward the
mandatory 5% level as carry-forward credits from
previous years were exhausted.
Exhibit 4 (page 15) plots the weighted average
payout rate for the pool for each year in the 25-year
period 1973-97. A horizontal line is drawn to indi-
cate the period during which the 5% minimum
payout rule was in force.
11
 Distributions that count toward the 5% requirement are defined by the Code as “qualifying distributions.” Qualifying distributions include
any amount paid to accomplish the foundation’s charitable purposes (including reasonable and necessary administrative expenses, grants, and
program-related investments) and any amount paid to acquire an asset used (or held for use) in carrying out the foundation’s charitable purpose.
An amount set aside for a specific project may be treated as a qualifying distribution if the foundation has prior approval from the IRS and the
cash distribution test is satisfied. Internal Revenue Code, §4942.
12
 This is the arithmetic average, as opposed to a geometric average, and derived by summing the payout rate for the pool for each year and
dividing by the number of years (in this case, 25).
13 For a contemporary analysis see, Reilly and Skadden, Op. Cit. (1981).
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Thus, if private founda-
tions are to maintain
their purchasing power
over time, the payout
rate must be set at a
level that will accommo-
date the necessary
discount to the expected
real rate of return, the
risk that the level of
expected returns or
inflation have been





how much lower than
the expected return
should the rate of
spending be?
•   The discount to the expected return should
logically be greater when there is concern over
higher levels of inflation in the future (i.e., when
specification risk with respect to inflation is
greater).  Increases in the rate of inflation (espe-
cially unexpected increases in the rate of inflation)
have historically led to low real returns in the
capital markets.
•   The discount to the expected level of return
should also be greater when there is concern that
the expected returns are too generous.
•   The discount to the expected level of return
should account for investment management
expenses and commissions.
Given the historically low levels of inflation and high
levels of capital market returns over the past decade,
the potential for higher levels of inflation or lower
market returns in the future are significant.  This would
argue for a larger, rather than smaller, discount to
expected return with regard to the optimal payout rate.
VI.  Future Projections
O ur analysis of foundation payout rates up to this point has been focused on the past, either in
terms of the performance of passive index data, or
with respect to the actual experience of a pool of
Michigan foundations. The following material ana-
lyzes expected future returns and their effect on
payout.
Expectations of Future Return
In Exhibit 5 (page 16),  we show the expected real
return and level of risk (as represented by the stan-
dard deviation of returns) for a hypothetical portfolio
invested, once again, 65% in U.S. equities and 35%
in U.S. bonds.  The inputs used in this modeling
exercise are shown at the top of the page and repre-
sent our estimates of long-term equilibrium real rates
of return.
Three observations should be made about these
expected rates of future return:
•   Purchasing power can be maintained only if the
real rate of spending is set lower than the ex-
pected real rate of return. For an expected
compound return of 5%, spending should be set
24 basis points lower than the expected com-
pound return.  Different levels of expected
compound returns would require different levels
of discount. (See Appendix A.)
•   There is the risk that our assumptions are too
generous: after the most rewarding 20 years for
investors in U.S. history, these long-term “equi-
librium” expectations may be found to have been
overly optimistic for periods shorter than the very
long-term (i.e., 30+ years).
•   Investment management expenses and commis-
sions are cash costs incurred in managing founda-
tion portfolios. These costs reduce expected
rates of returns compared to market index
returns that do not have these costs.
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Estimating the Variability of Returns
and Probability of Maintaining
Purchasing Power
Exhibit 5 shows that the expected long-term real
return from the 65/35 portfolio is 5.46%. This
expected real return represents the mean return over
long periods of time and significant volatility around
this mean is likely.  Indeed, the expected annual
standard deviation of returns around this mean is
13.85 percentage points. Thus, in two-thirds of all
years, we expect the 65/35 portfolio to have a return
of between a positive 19.31% (real compound return
+ 1 standard deviation) and a negative 8.39% (real
compound return -1 standard deviation).  The pres-
ence of positive variability around the expected mean
requires institutions to pay out less than the expected
average return in order to have a high probability of
maintaining purchasing power by the end of a multi-
year period. This insight can be illustrated through the
use of Monte Carlo simulations.
Monte Carlo simulation models offer a method for
seeing in greater detail the variation that is possible
around the long-run expected averages noted in the
previous section.  Monte Carlo simulations utilize the
same inputs for return, risk, and correlation that are
the basis of mean variance analysis, but randomly
calculate the possible returns over several thousand
time paths.  Analysis of past performance reflects
only one time path, whereas Monte Carlo analysis
provides the ability to see the potential outcomes
from a much larger set of time paths.
Exhibit 6 (page 16) shows the range of real returns
for payout rates of 4%, 5%, 6%, and 7% at the end
of 25- and 30-year time periods in the future (based
on a 65/35 portfolio). (See Appendix B for addi-
tional details of the results from this modeling exer-
cise, including results over other time periods.)
Under the ranges in expected outcomes for each










at or near 70% for
a 4% payout rate
to at or near 30%
for a 7% payout
rate, with the 5%
payout rate having








in Section II of this
report indicates that a rate of payout in excess of 5%
would not have maintained the purchasing power of a
foundation over the period 1973-97. Similarly, this
forward looking set of projections argues against the
ability of foundations to maintain purchasing power in
the future with a payout rate greater than 5%, due to
the variability that will occur around the long-term
expected mean return.









value of its payout,
about a 4-in-10
chance at a 6%
payout rate, and
about a 3-in-10
chance at a 7%
payout rate.
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VII.  Conclusions
I n this study, the question has been: what is the sustainable level of real payout for private founda-
tions?  Only by maintaining the purchasing power of the
corpus over time can there be a reasonable confidence
of providing a sustainable level of payout.  Nonetheless,
the focus of this study is to ascertain the sustainable
level of payout for foundations, and not to articulate the
various reasons that support the desirability of en-
abling sustainability.
Current law requires the distribution of at least 5% of
the value of a private foundation’s investment assets.
Nothing in current law restricts a donor from mandat-
ing higher  payout rates if that is desired.  Absent
some restriction specified by the donor, private
foundations are currently free to set higher rates if
they believe that higher rates are warranted.  How-
ever, the analysis suggests that payout rates above
5% will result in the erosion of a fund’s asset value
(and therefore its real payout distributions) over time.
•  Past levels of returns (using index data as a proxy)
do not support a payout rate higher than 5% (see
Section II of this study);
•  Past levels of actual returns, drawn from a sample
of Michigan foundations, do not support a rate
higher than 5% (see Section IV of this study); and
•  Simulations of future returns (based on Monte
Carlo simulation methods) do not support a
payout rate greater than 5% (see Section VI and
Appendix B).
Accordingly, the current 5% payout rate provides
founding donors with a reasonable expectation that
real payout will be maintained in perpetuity. To raise
the currently mandated rate would eliminate that
expectation by undermining the ability of private
foundations to sustain the purchasing power of their
payout over time.
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 SPEND VARIOUS %’s OF A FOUR-QUARTER AVERAGE BEGINNING MARKET VALUE
Assumptions:
- Begin with $100 million on January 1, 1969.
- Constant asset allocation of 65% U.S. stocks and 35% U.S. fixed income rebalanced to target policy each year.
- Performance is based on annual market index data.
Exhibit 1
Real Fund Market Values After Spending
REAL SPENDING SIMULATION









































































































• The period shown here
begins towards the end
of the great bull market
of the 1950s and
1960s.  By 1968, the
diversified Michigan
foundations we sur-
veyed had over 50% of
their assets allocated to
equities, virtually all
invested in U.S. stocks.




had a negative real
return.
• Whatever the period,
however, the following
holds true: the more
you spend today, the
less you will be able to
spend tomorrow
because a higher rate
of spending eats more
rapidly into the market
value of the fund.
• Note that by the end of
1998, real spending
(i.e., after inflation) for
each of these funds
remains below the
1969 level, with the
sole exception of the
fund spending 4%.
• In addition, only the funds spending 4% and 5% have succeeded in preserving their real value over this
period.  Those spending 6% and 7% remain substantially poorer than they were in 1969.
• Finally, these illustrations pre-suppose a disciplined, long-term investor that rebalances to the target asset
allocations each year.  Any investor that failed to rebalance, or bailed out of stocks after the 1973-74 decline,
or employed active managers that underperformed the market indexes, would have had worse results than
those shown here.
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Exhibit 2
• The two charts in
Exhibit 2 are
designed to show
the effects on a
fund that succumbs
to pressure to raise
payout towards the
end of a bull
market.
• Because it has paid
out more, Fund B
is more severely
depleted than Fund




that of Fund A
when the markets
recover.








still spending less in
1998 than they




ing from both funds
over the period
measured was nearly identical (Fund A had cumulative spending of $94.82 per $100 of original value and
Fund B had $94.17 per $100).  Nonetheless, the higher absolute level of spending achieved by Fund A by
the end of the period means that if the two funds follow identical spending rules after 1998, Fund A will have
a higher cumulative level of spending.
VARIABLE VERSUS CONSTANT SPENDING RATES IN BEAR MARKET
Assumptions:
- Fund A: Spend 5% of a 4-quarter average beginning market value each year.
- Fund B: Spend 5% in 1969, 5.5% in 1970, 6% in 1971, 6.5% in 1972, 7% from 1973 through 1975, 6.5% in 1976,
  6% in 1977, and 5% each year there after.   All annual spending is of a 4-quarter average beginning market value.
- Begin with $100 million on January 1, 1969.
- Constant asset allocation of 65% U.S. stocks and 35% U.S. fixed income rebalanced to target policy each year.
- Performance is based on annual market index data.
Exhibit 2
Real Fund Market Values After Spending
REAL SPENDING SIMULATION


























































































BEAR MARKET BULL MARKET
BEAR MARKET BULL MARKET
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DIVERSIFIED MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS

























Note: Results calculated from the 26 diversified Michigan
foundations that responded to the asset allocation section of the survey.
Exhibit 3
Exhibit 3
• As a long equity bull market
progresses, investors tend
to become more optimistic,
less attuned to stock market
risk, and raise their alloca-
tions to equities, either by
shifting money from fixed
income and other invest-
ments or simply by not
rebalancing their portfolios.
Although capitalization-
weighted  indexes like the
S&P 500 did not in fact
peak until 1973, most
stocks topped out in 1968
and began a long secular
decline that accelerated
dramatically in 1973-74.
• In a bear market, of course,
investors’ risk aversion rises
sharply and persists long
after stocks have started to
recover.  Note that the
sizeable cash balances of
1974 persisted as late as
1981, while the allocation
to equities has grown
steadily as the great bull
market of the 1990s has
advanced.
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RESPONSE POOL PAYOUT RATES
Source: Response pool comprised of all 48 Michigan foundations who responded to the survey.
Note:     Prior to 1982, a higher of adjusted net income or variable percentage rule was in force.
              From 1982 on, a constant 5% rule was mandated.
Exhibit 4






























































Spending Rates Legal Minimum Spending
(Variable Rule in Force)
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Exhibit 6
• The objective of a Monte Carlo
simulation is to determine the statistical
probability of different outcomes for a
portfolio with a particular asset
allocation, given assumptions as to the
future returns, variability of returns,
and correlation of returns among the
asset classes included.
• In this case, the objective is to deter-
mine the probability of preserving the
real value (i.e., maintaining the pur-
chasing power) at different spending
rates, over a 25- and 30-year period.
• Note that spending rates in excess of
5% result in less than a 50/50 chance
that the value of the fund will be
maintained over time, adjusted for
inflation.
25-Year 30-Year
 Time Horizon Time Horizon
4% Payout Rate 70.00% 71.30%
5% Payout Rate 56.30% 57.90%
6% Payout Rate 44.20% 43.10%
7% Payout Rate 30.10% 29.00%
A 65/35 Portfolio represents a portfolio with a 65% allocation to the S&P 500 




MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OUTPUT
Probability of Maintaining
65% STOCK/35% BOND PORTFOLIO




Asset Class Avg. Return (%) Risk U.S. Equity U.S.FI U.S. Cash
U.S. Equity 7.75     18.50   1.0      - -
U.S. Fixed Income 3.75     9.75   0.4      1.0       -
U.S. Cash 1.00     4.00   0.3      0.7       1.0       
Inflation 3.00     -
EXPECTED REAL RETURN AND RISK
Real Compound Return 5.46%    
Real Arithmetic Avg. Return 6.35%    
Standard Deviation (Risk) 13.85     
Arithmetic Avg. Return/Risk 0.46     
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Appendixes
The equations below describe the relationship between
portfolio returns and spending.  In order to maintain the
real value of a portfolio, the dollar amount of spending
must be equal to, or less than, the real dollar amount of
investment return.  This implies that the spending rate
must be less than the real investment return, provided
that the investment return is greater than or equal to zero.
The summary equation can be illustrated by the follow-
ing example.  If beginning market value is $100 and
real investment return is 6%, or $6, in order to maintain
the real market value of the portfolio, spending cannot
exceed $6.  Therefore, the maximum spending rate that
would maintain purchasing power is equal to 5.66%
($6/$106) of ending market value before spending.  If
the spending percentage were the same as the return,
the spending would be 6% of $106 ($6.36), leaving the
market value at $99.64.  This scenario is a one-year
example, but the rule also applies to multi-year scenarios.
The proof that follows characterizes one spending rule
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an estimate of trailing-average spending rules.  It does
not take into account spending caps or floors.  It can,
however, suggest the nature of the relationship between
spending and investment return.  Spending and invest-
ment returns are assumed to occur at the same points
in time relative to one another.  In other words, if spend-
ing occurs at a certain time, it must occur at that time
every period (i.e., always after the second month or
between the 3rd and 4th quarters, etc).  Note that the
same analysis, which is shown here in real terms, ap-
plies equally to nominal values.
Variables defined:
Ai – Real market value at beginning of year i
ri – Real investment return during year i
s – Spending as a percent of beginning market value
(1-s is the amount of the portfolio remaining after spend-
ing)
c – Real compound (geometric average) return for the
portfolio over the entire time horizon, which must be
greater than or equal to 0.
Appendix A
RELATIONSHIP OF PAYOUT AND EXPECTED RETURN
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COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
65% U.S. EQUITY/35% U.S. FIXED INCOME 
SPEND 4% OF A FOUR-QUARTER AVERAGE MARKET VALUE
($ Millions)
Nominal Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $213.6  $335.7  $495.7  $719.8  $1,088.5  $1,497.4  
50th (Median) 124.6  156.9  196.9  241.7  302.3  $382.2  
5th (Worst Case) 73.6  75.9  79.8  85.8  96.4  $109.9  
Real Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $184.2  $249.8  $318.2  $398.5  $519.9  $616.9  
50th (Median) 107.5  116.8  126.4  133.8  144.4  157.5  
5th (Worst Case) 63.5  56.5  51.2  47.5  46.0  45.3  
Probability of Maintaining Real Purchasing Power 59.6% 62.1% 66.1% 68.7% 70.0% 71.3%
Nominal Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $7.1  $11.4  $17.3  $25.2  $39.0  $55.1  
50th (Median) 4.7  5.8  7.3  9.1  11.3  13.9  
5th (Worst Case) 3.1  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.8  4.4  
Standard Deviation 1.3  2.7  4.8  7.5  11.8  17.2  
Real Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $6.2  $8.6  $11.2  $14.1  $18.8  $23.0  
50th (Median) 4.1  4.4  4.7  5.1  5.4  5.8  
5th (Worst Case) 2.7  2.3  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.8  
Standard Deviation 1.1  2.1  3.1  4.2  5.7  7.2  
Real Cumulative Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $24.7  $61.8  $109.3  $169.7  $251.7  $350.8  
50th (Median) 19.9  41.4  64.4  90.2  117.7  147.1  
5th (Worst Case) 16.3  29.5  41.8  53.8  65.3  75.9  
* Begin with a market value of $100 million.  Inflation is assumed to be 3% per year. 
Appendix B
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION OUTPUT
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COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
65% U.S. EQUITY/35% U.S. FIXED INCOME 
SPEND 5% OF A FOUR-QUARTER AVERAGE MARKET VALUE
($ Millions)
Nominal Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $202.9  $299.4  $438.7  $612.3  $804.5  $1,073.9  
50th (Median) 118.5  140.1  167.9  197.5  234.3  $283.4  
5th (Worst Case) 71.5  67.8  67.1  69.6  73.7  $77.8  
Real Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $175.0  $222.7  $281.6  $339.0  $384.2  $442.4  
50th (Median) 102.3  104.3  107.7  109.3  111.9  116.8  
5th (Worst Case) 61.6  50.5  43.1  38.6  35.2  32.0  
Probability of Maintaining Real Purchasing Power 53.3% 54.5% 55.4% 55.1% 56.3% 57.9%
Nominal Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $8.5  $13.0  $19.4  $27.6  $36.5  $46.9  
50th (Median) 5.6  6.7  8.0  9.3  11.2  13.4  
5th (Worst Case) 3.7  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.6  3.8  
Standard Deviation 1.5  3.2  5.2  8.2  11.4  15.6  
Real Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $7.4  $9.8  $12.6  $15.5  $17.6  $19.5  
50th (Median) 4.9  5.0  5.2  5.2  5.4  5.6  
5th (Worst Case) 3.3  2.6  2.2  1.9  1.7  1.6  
Standard Deviation 1.3  2.4  3.4  4.6  5.5  6.5  
Real Cumulative Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $30.2  $72.4  $125.4  $192.9  $273.1  $361.8  
50th (Median) 24.4  49.6  75.9  102.3  130.0  158.6  
5th (Worst Case) 20.1  35.6  49.2  60.3  72.4  82.4  
* Begin with a market value of $100 million.  Inflation is assumed to be 3% per year. 
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COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
65% U.S. EQUITY/35% U.S. FIXED INCOME 
SPEND 6% OF A FOUR-QUARTER AVERAGE MARKET VALUE
($ Millions)
Nominal Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $195.4  $269.1  $358.3  $465.1  $611.3  $762.7  
50th (Median) 112.5  128.1  145.7  164.8  183.8  $210.8  
5th (Worst Case) 66.5  60.4  57.5  57.1  56.2  $57.0  
Real Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $168.5  $200.2  $230.0  $257.5  $292.0  $315.3  
50th (Median) 97.1  95.3  93.5  91.2  87.8  86.9  
5th (Worst Case) 57.4  44.9  36.9  31.6  26.8  23.5  
Probability of Maintaining Real Purchasing Power 46.3% 45.6% 45.0% 44.5% 44.2% 43.1%
Nominal Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $10.1  $14.6  $19.6  $26.0  $33.0  $43.9  
50th (Median) 6.5  7.5  8.5  9.5  10.7  12.2  
5th (Worst Case) 4.2  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4  
Standard Deviation 1.8  3.5  5.4  7.8  11.1  15.2  
Real Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $8.8  $11.0  $12.7  $14.6  $15.9  $18.3  
50th (Median) 5.7  5.6  5.5  5.3  5.2  5.1  
5th (Worst Case) 3.7  2.7  2.3  2.0  1.7  1.4  
Standard Deviation 1.6  2.6  3.5  4.4  5.3  6.3  
Real Cumulative Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $36.2  $85.0  $141.7  $203.9  $274.9  $351.6  
50th (Median) 28.8  57.2  85.7  113.9  140.6  166.5  
5th (Worst Case) 23.8  40.8  54.9  66.7  78.1  88.8  
* Begin with a market value of $100 million.  Inflation is assumed to be 3% per year. 
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COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS
MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
65% U.S. EQUITY/35% U.S. FIXED INCOME 
SPEND 7% OF A FOUR-QUARTER AVERAGE MARKET VALUE
($ Millions)
Nominal Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $182.1  $241.9  $320.2  $402.8  $507.7  $652.6  
50th (Median) 107.3  115.5  123.8  131.4  143.0  $156.1  
5th (Worst Case) 61.4  54.1  48.3  44.9  39.8  $37.2  
Real Ending Market Value
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $157.1  $180.0  $205.5  $223.0  $242.5  $268.9  
50th (Median) 92.5  85.9  79.5  72.8  68.3  64.3  
5th (Worst Case) 52.9  40.3  31.0  24.9  19.0  15.3  
Probability of Maintaining Real Purchasing Power 40.6% 37.7% 34.9% 32.4% 30.1% 29.0%
Nominal Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $11.3  $16.0  $20.7  $26.4  $32.0  $43.1  
50th (Median) 7.4  8.0  8.4  9.1  9.8  10.5  
5th (Worst Case) 4.6  3.9  3.4  3.2  2.9  2.8  
Standard Deviation 2.1  3.9  5.8  8.0  10.3  13.9  
Real Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $9.8  $12.0  $13.5  $14.8  $15.5  $18.0  
50th (Median) 6.4  6.0  5.5  5.1  4.7  4.4  
5th (Worst Case) 4.0  3.0  2.2  1.8  1.4  1.1  
Standard Deviation 1.8  2.9  3.7  4.5  5.0  5.8  
Real Cumulative Spending
Percentile Outcome 5 Years 10 Years 15 Years 20 Years 25 Years 30Years
95th (Best Case) $41.7  $92.9  $155.0  $218.0  $291.3  $367.7  
50th (Median) 33.3  64.4  93.4  120.6  145.8  169.9  
5th (Worst Case) 27.1  45.2  59.8  72.1  82.7  90.8  
* Begin with a market value of $100 million.  Inflation is assumed to be 3% per year. 
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For all responding foundations, including those with
single-stock concentrations
weighted average allocations for the pool
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Appendix D
COMPOSITION OF THE RESPONSE POOL
1.   Institutions Responding
For this study, financial information was gathered on 48 Michigan foundations, including:
The Talbot and Leota Abrams Foundation
The A.G. Bishop Charitable Trust*+
The Frank Andersen Foundation
The Barstow Foundation*
The Besser Foundation
The DeSeranno Educational Foundation*
The Charles DeVlieg Foundation
The Alden and Vada Dow Foundation*
The Herbert H. and Grace A. Dow Foundation*+




The Rollin M. Gerstacker Foundation*
The Greater Lansing Foundation
The Luella Hannan Foundation
The Charles Stewart Harding Foundation
The Herrick Foundation*
The James and Lynelle Holden Foundation
The Hudson-Webber Foundation+
The Michael Jeffers Memorial Foundation
The W. K. Kellogg Foundation*+
The Kresge Foundation+
The Benard L. Maas Foundation
The Edward and Helen Mardigian Foundation
The Oliver Dewey Marcks Foundation
The Mark Heritage Foundation




The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation+
The Louis and Helen Padnos Foundation
The Elsa U. Pardee Foundation*
The Plym Foundation
The Meyer and Anna Prentis Family Foundation*
The Milton Ratner Foundation
The Skillman Foundation
The Charles J. Strosacker Foundation*
The Harry A. and Margaret D. Towsley Foundation*
The Harold and Grace Upjohn Foundation
The John W. and Rose E. Watson Scholarship
Foundation+
The Wege Foundation*
The Henry and Consuelo Wenger Foundation+
The Whiting Foundation
The David M. Whitney Fund
The Harvery Randall Wickes Foundation+
The Wickson-Link Memorial Foundation
The following non-Michigan foundations provided
performance and asset allocation information for
our use by way of comparison.
The Carnegie Corporation of New York
The Duke Endowment*+
The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation+
The Rockefeller Brothers Fund+
The Rockefeller Foundation+
The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation+
* Indicates a foundation that held a single-stock
 concentration at some point in the period under review.
+ Indicates a foundation with an unbroken 25-year time series,
 all others having data missing in at least one year.
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2.  Alternative Methods of Computing Returns
The foundations in Section I were divided into the
following four groups for analysis:
Group A—includes all Michigan institutions that
responded to the study.
Group B—includes 33 Michigan foundations with
diversified investment portfolios.
Group C—includes 11 foundations with a complete
set of returns for the entire 25-year period.
Group D—includes 8 large foundations with diversi-
fied investment portfolios, including three from
Michigan and five from other states.
Group A represents all 48 Michigan foundations that
responded to the study.  The foundations varied in
asset size and date of origin.  Additionally, the
submitted responses varied in completeness with
regard to providing returns for the 25-year period.
Group B represents the diversified Michigan portfo-
lios. This group was chosen as the most useful group
for comparing the actual aggregate weighted average
rate of return with market rates of return.  The
market rates of return were derived from diversified
portfolios representing investment exposure across a
broad range of investments.
The non-diversified Michigan portfolios, most of
which held either Dow Chemical Co. or Kellogg
Company common stock, were separated from the
diversified portfolios for the following reasons.
1. Single-stock portfolio rates of return are not
comparable to broad market or index rates of
return.
2. A sample of actual rates of return from non-
diversified portfolios that included many different
single stocks might be valid, if the different single
stocks provided ample diversification at an
aggregate level. The Michigan sample included
just a couple of stocks and, therefore, is not a
valid comparative sample.
3. The long-term rate of return from a single-stock
portfolio may be significantly higher than a
diversified portfolio because of the substantially
higher risk of investing in one stock.  Fiduciaries
who maintain single-stock portfolios do so with
the expectation that the long-term rates of return
will be favorable compared to market or diversi-
fied rates of return.  Portfolios managed this way
often accept long periods of relative under
performance and long periods of relative over
performance.  Payout is, of course, affected
accordingly during the relatively good and bad
periods.
4. Fiduciaries that are not required by trust instrument
to maintain single-stock portfolios do not usually
have the choice to invest an entire portfolio in a
single security.
Group C represents the respondents to the study that
provided a complete series of returns for the entire 25-
year period.  These eleven foundations varied in asset
size and validated the returns of the 48 Michigan only
responses, as the returns were virtually identical.  Thus,
the absence of certain years’ data does not affect the
validity of Group A’s results.
Group D includes actual rate of return data from eight
large Michigan and non-Michigan foundations with di-
versified portfolios.  All of these foundations have long
operating histories and are highly visible, well-known
institutions.  The returns of the eight large foundations
are comparable to the returns of the 33 diversified
Michigan foundations, indicating that size did not affect
performance results.
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3.   Weighted Returns for the Alternative Groups
1973-1997 Group A Group B Group C Group D
Implied 48 Michigan only 33 Michigan only 11 Completed 8 Large Diversified
Returns Universe Responses Diversified Responses Universe Responses Foundations
Nominal 12.48% 11.04% 12.41% 11.06%
Real   6.64%   5.27%   6.57%   5.29%
The above implied rates of return were obtained by performing the following calculation from the data reported
on the IRS Form 990PF:
(Year 0 Value of Non-charitable Assets – Year 1 Value of Non-charitable assets) + Qualified Distributions + Excise Taxes
Paid – Contributions / Year 0 Value of Non Charitable assets
Once an implied return was obtained for a given year, the returns were aggregated and weighted according to market
capitalization to provide a return series that was then geometrically linked to form an average annual compound return.
Real returns were derived using a CPI deflator, thereby adjusting the nominal returns for inflation.
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